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Faculty and Deans

ABC V. AEREO AND THE HUMBLE
JUDGE
James Y. Stern

∗

American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.1 was a lawyer’s
case if ever there was one. Aereo, a New York-based tech startup,
offered a service that allowed subscribers to watch local broadcast
television through an internet connection, thus bypassing the need
for cable service to receive ordinary network programming. The
trouble is that copyright law forbids retransmitting television programs to the public without the copyright-holder’s consent, which
doesn’t come cheap.2 Aereo, however, thought it could avoid any
copyright problems through an unusual set-up. It devised a system
in which it maintained thousands of tiny television antennas, each
about the size of a dime. A subscriber watching a program through
Aereo’s service would be assigned a unique antenna. The signal
from the antenna would then be converted into a digital file on

Assistant Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law.
134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
2 For cable companies, the cost of copyright is diminished by the statutory licensing regime established by the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 111. The cost of rebroadcasting network programming is nevertheless substantial by virtue of the “retransmission consent” provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, which separately require permission from broadcasters to
retransmit their broadcasts. See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b).
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Aereo’s computers, again assigned only to the subscriber, which the
subscriber could then watch through a streaming interface virtually
simultaneous with the broadcast over the airwaves. The system
was intended to capitalize on previously recognized limits on the
scope of copyright law.
Despite this peculiar arrangement, Aereo was immediately
sued by various broadcast television interests holding copyrights in
material Aereo subscribers received. Broadcast television is given
to viewers for free, of course, and broadcasters have traditionally
derived the bulk of their revenues from advertising. One might
think broadcasters would be enthusiastic about the prospect of distributing their material more widely and easily. But the broadcast
networks have become increasingly dependent on royalties paid by
cable companies, which themselves enjoy considerable market
power. By repelling Aereo, broadcasters preserved the ability to
base their business model on recouping a portion of the subscription fees cable providers receive from their customers, rather than
on advertising alone.
The essential legal issue in Aereo concerned the scope of control
over broadcasts of copyrighted material conferred by copyright
law. Confusingly, however, the statutory question turned on the
meaning of a copyright-holder’s exclusive right “to perform the
copyrighted work publicly.”3 The Copyright Act does not refer to
an exclusive right to broadcast a copyrighted work; rather, it classifies transmitting to the public as a type of public performance, like
reciting, dancing, and acting.4

3
4

17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
The definitional section of the Copyright Act, Section 101, provides that:
To “perform” a work means … in the case of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the
sounds accompanying it audible.
To perform … a work “publicly” means… to transmit or otherwise
communicate a performance … of the work … to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of re-
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Much attention in the case centered on whether Aereo was performing “publicly,” given the use of individual antennae and individual files. All sides evidently assumed that a transmission to only
one person is not “to the public.” The question was how to count
transmissions. Should each sending of a broadcast signal be treated
as a separate transmission—in which case no transmission ever
reached more than a single subscriber? Or should the separate
sending of signals to different subscribers but relaying the same
underlying content be treated as a single, aggregate transmission—
in which case transmissions through the Aereo service were undoubtedly public?
In constructing its system, Aereo relied on the Second Circuit’s
earlier Cartoon Networks decision.5 Cartoon Networks dealt with remote DVR technology supplied by a cable company, which essentially replicates the ability to record television programs at home
but by means of equipment owned and maintained by the cable
company, rather than the viewer. The Cartoon Networks court concluded that transmissions of each user’s file containing a given recorded program to the user were private transmissions for copyright
purposes. Aereo’s peculiar model with the thousands of microantennae followed the path laid out in Cartoon Networks, and, Aereo
argued, was clearly permissible under that decision. The District
Court in the Aereo litigation agreed, denying a request for a prelim-

ceiving the performance … receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.
To “transmit” a performance … is to communicate it by any device or
process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from
which they are sent.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
5 See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.
2008).
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inary injunction to shut the service down.6 The Second Circuit affirmed and rejected calls to reconsider Cartoon Networks.7
But the story was different at the Supreme Court. Joined by
five of his colleagues, Justice Breyer saw Aereo’s system as a clear
attempt to evade copyright law by means of the most technical of
technicalities, and declared that Aereo was very much engaged in
transmitting to the public. The conclusion was partly grounded in
the text, but more generally in a congressional purpose to ensure
that copyright law covered rebroadcasts by cable companies. Shortly before enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, the Supreme Court
decided a pair of cases involving early forms of cable, holding that
the cable providers did not violate copyright holders’ exclusive performance rights.8 According to Justice Breyer, Congress added the
transmission language in the 1976 Act to overturn the results of
those decisions. Aereo’s use of individual antennae and distinct
computer files for each subscriber was therefore irrelevant, for one
simple reason: “In terms of the Act’s purposes, these differences do
not distinguish Aereo’s system from cable systems.”9
In dissent, Justice Scalia sidestepped the public-versus-private
question, arguing instead that Aereo did not “perform” at all for
purposes of the Copyright Act—not because there wasn’t a performance but because Aereo wasn’t the performer.10 On his reading, it
was the Aereo subscriber alone who actually transmits the copyrighted work, not Aereo. Aereo merely supplied the equipment
necessary to transmit a broadcast to the subscriber’s computer. Just

6 See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. AEREO, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
7 See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013). See also WNET,
Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2013) (denying rehearing en banc).
8 See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974);
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists TV, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
9 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2498.
10 The district court had declined to reach the issue given its conclusion that the
case was controlled by Cartoon Networks.
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as a copyshop does not itself engage in the act of copying when a
customer uses one of its photocopiers, Aereo did not perform a
work when a subscribers logged in and obtained content via its system. Copyright, he argued, requires a “volitional act,” and because
the Aereo subscriber, not Aereo, decided when and what to transmit, the subscriber alone was the performing party for purposes of
copyright law.
The Aereo decision appears to defy a number of ready assumptions. Although intellectual property law is not as ideologically
charged as constitutional law, it has its political valences, with a
somewhat greater enthusiasm for the defense and expansion of IP
protection on the right than on the left.11 In Aereo, however, it was
the three justices conventionally identified as the most politically
conservative—Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—who were unwilling to
find infringement. By contrast, the majority’s opinion was authored
by Stephen Breyer, author of an early academic critique of copyright law.12 One need not believe justices simply vote their preferences to think that in complex and textually ambiguous cases like
Aereo, those preferences will exert some pull on the way interpretive
questions are approached. Aereo, however, seems to come out
backwards as a matter of predilection.
Then there is methodology. Copyright is governed by a bulky
and elaborate statute, and Aereo was expected to turn on a fine parsing of the statutory language, the definition of “publicly” in particular. Yet while Justice Scalia is surely the foremost judicial advocate
of textualism, his challenge to Justice Breyer lay not in an analysis of
either the verb “perform” or the adverb “publicly” but the seeming-

11 See Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi, Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 803 (2009) (concluding political ideology “is a significant determinant of IP cases.”). See also DEBORA J. HALBERT,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE: THE POLITICS OF EXPANDING
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS (1999).
12 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).

86

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty

[Vol. 9:81

ly existential, theoretical question of who the performer is when a
performance occurs. This is not a “textual” question in the ordinary
sense; a dictionary definition of “perform” will not reveal whether
A’s provision of the means by which B accomplishes some task
should be treated as a situation in which A performs the same act as
B. Neither, however, is it at odds with a textual approach to copyright. Legal construction and legal systems inevitably depend on a
vocabulary of assumed concepts. To acknowledge that the action
may be taking place off the textual stage is not to depart from a
commitment to a text-centric mode of interpretation, although the
frequency with which such problems occur may weaken the case
for such a method.
Meanwhile, although Justice Breyer’s opinion ultimately centered on congressional purpose, rather than textual niceties, he
dwelt on the text at considerable length. Moreover, his seemingly
more pragmatic analysis itself rested upon some formal, if unarticulated, premises. Aereo argued that it was supplying technology
that would have been perfectly lawful for viewers to use themselves, by watching with rabbit ears on their own television sets. If
Aereo’s business had been to rent television antennas, delivering
them by physical possession, it is hard to imagine Breyer would
have decided that Aereo was “substantially similar” to a cable provider.13 Breyer’s conclusion seems to give decisive weight to the
location of the antenna—whether it is on Aereo’s property or the
Aereo subscriber’s. Put differently, if Aereo had sent antennas to its
subscribers, rather signals from antennas, it would not have been
“performing publicly.” The point is not that this distinction is necessarily unjustifiable but that no justifications were provided. Breyer’s analysis, no less than Scalia’s, relies on an assumed conceptual
framework to cabin the field of inquiry.

13 See Aereo, 134 S. Ct., at 2506 (“In providing this service, Aereo uses its own
equipment, housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users' homes.”).

2015]

THE HUMBLE JUDGE

87

Recognizing the role played by assumed concepts is important
because those concepts themselves embed practical judgments and
offer strategies for dealing with problems that may otherwise exhaust interpretive resources. Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the need
for a “voluntary act” is a good example. The great shadow hanging
over the Aereo case is the vast technological infrastructure that the
Court by its own admission does not really understand. In particular, the fear raised in advance of Aereo was that a decision against
the company would jeopardize practices like cloud computing and
remote data storage, in which firms enable users to perform tasks
through an internet connection on the companies’ own hardware in
ways that replicate functions that might otherwise be performed
using the user’s own equipment.
Technological developments are blurring the lines used to separate actions and objects into the categories used to structure legal
systems. Tasks that were once performed entirely in-house now
involve a more intensive contribution by outsiders. Obtaining, receiving, transmitting, organizing, analyzing, and storing data are
less likely to be carried out on a discrete “PC” in ways entirely within the control of the user. And tasks that were performed by outsiders now involve more substantial end-user participation. Under
the old model, television broadcast networks and cable television
providers choose what will be available to watch and when. Today,
services like Netflix supply content but enable users to make those
choices. Remote connections make it possible for users to share
common resources—hardware, software, and data—and enable
greater flexibility in being able to use those capabilities than when
users have to supply equivalent goods to themselves. All of this is
to the good, but it strains legal rules that were not designed with
such complex interrelationships in mind.14

14 See Jonah M. Knobler, Performance Anxiety: The Internet and Copyright’s Vanishing Performance/distribution Distinction, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 531, 533 (2007)
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Justice Scalia’s stress on legal principles of agency and responsibility—in this case, through the “volitional act doctrine”—is a sensible response to such issues. The question he put his finger on is
essentially a variant on the problem of proximate cause to which
law students are introduced almost as soon as their legal education
begins; the context may be novel, but the problem is one the law has
worked over many times. The doctrine Scalia would have used to
decide the case offers one analytical tool to draw lines more precisely, now that processes are becoming more integrated. Whether
Scalia provided the best or most persuasive answer to the responsibility question, he asked the right question.
At the same time, however, it may well be that the “volitional
act” concept is not up to the task in the long run. The distinction
between an on-demand video service, which selects its library of
programs, and a service like Aereo, which seemingly takes its programming as it comes, is hardly airtight. If Netflix buys its titles in
bulk from a particular studio, does it really “curate” its collection?
While there is a definite risk of overreacting to technological developments and underestimating the adaptability of existing legal constructs, it is nevertheless true that “digital technology produces a
breakdown and conflation of legal categories that were meaningful
in the analog era.” 15 But again, the need for new conceptual
frameworks is less likely to be recognized unless the role played by
existing frameworks is appreciated.
In the final analysis, Aereo may be less useful as a window into
the path copyright law is likely to follow in the realm of media and
communications technology than as an illustration of two alternative attitudes to the problem of technological change. “A man’s got
to know his limitations,” said a famous San Franciscan. It wasn’t

(questioning whether the “traditional categories and distinctions in copyright law—
such as the once obvious distinction among ‘performances,’ ‘reproductions,’ and
‘distributions’—remain meaningful and applicable in the Internet context at all.”).
15 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §8.024 (2008).
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Stephen Breyer, but it might as well have been. Breyer is altogether
aware of his shortcomings as an analyst of things high-tech—as indeed is the Court more generally.16 Breyer’s Aereo opinion was designed to be minimal. Its “limited holding,” he wrote, should not
have the effect either “to discourage or to control the emergence or
use of different kinds of technologies” in ways Congress did not
intend.17 The lynchpin of the Court’s decision was its conclusion
that Aereo’s service was “highly similar” to the kinds of cable retransmission Congress intended to reach in the Copyright Act.18
This was meant as reassurance. Developers of new technology
need not fret, so long as they can avoid offering something that
looks like, or almost like, cable television. The message, in other
words, was “We know ’em when we see ’em—and so do you. So
don’t worry. We’ll get this right.”
The problem with this approach is two-fold. First, it rests on an
exaggerated self-confidence. It assumes judicial judgments as to
what are and are not cable equivalents will be so obviously correct
that reasonable minds will have no real difficulty figuring out what
activities fall within the danger zone. Having reached a conclusion,
it is natural to think its logic is self-evident. But there will always
be close cases, and a standard based on similarity to cable television

16 See, e.g., City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (“The judiciary
risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.”). One may say of the
Court’s modesty that it has much to be modest about. At oral argument in a recent
Fourth Amendment case, for example, Justice Breyer admitted he did not know what
kind of phone he has “because I can never get into it because of the password.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, United States v. Wurie, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (No. 13212),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/13-212_g2il.pdf. “The justices are not necessarily the most technologically sophisticated people,” according to Justice Elena Kagan, who explains that
“the court hasn’t really ‘gotten to’ email.” Kagan: Justices Not Tech Savvy, Send
Paper Memos, Associated Press, August 20, 2013.
17 Aereo, 134 S. Ct., at 2510.
18 Id. at 2511.
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seems likely to produce more than its fair share of them. After all,
even Aereo is not functionally identical to cable, not only because it
also offers recording capabilities but also because it delivers data
directly to computers, tablets, and similar devices.19
The second problem is that the cable similarity test bears no relation to the language of the statute or the Aereo Court’s various
statements interpreting that language. Consider the example of
remote DVR services. Time-shifting—the practice of recording a
program for later playback— certainly seems quite different from
the early forms of cable transmission to which Congress was responding when it enacted the relevant provisions of the Copyright
Act in 1976. The statute itself, however, speaks only of performing
“publicly.” The Aereo majority’s central argument in response to
the Second Circuit was that multiple separate acts of communication to separate recipients counts as a transmission “to the public”
so long as the same content is relayed to each, and that concept is
not limited to cable television equivalents. It plainly implicates services like remote DVR services, not to mention remote data storage
more generally, cloud computing, internet service provision, and so
on. Perhaps the Court did not intend its discussion to be taken seriously, but investors, entrepreneurs, and litigants ignore the
Court’s stated reasoning at their peril.
The irony of Aereo, then is that the Court’s minimalist instinct is
grounded in a fear of disrupting high-tech fields and squelching
innovation, but the Court’s very reticence and unwillingness to seek
consistency may encourage those results. The Court should not be
faulted for self-conscious prudence, restraint, and humility. But the
question is what to do when one knows that one knows so little. It

19 There are other differences, such as the non-broadcast content cable companies
supply. In addition, Aereo has no particular advantage in the market over competitors, while cable companies have long enjoyed market power. See Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., Aereo and Copyright’s Private-Public Performance Line, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
205, 215–217 (2014).
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may generally be better in the fast-changing world of technological
innovation to have clear rules and adhere to the standard tools of
legal reasoning than to pull back and retreat into vagueness when
the consequences seem uncertain. The nervous driver may be inclined to slow down in trying to pull onto a crowded and fastmoving highway, but the safer course is often to speed up. Aereo
might seem like a quirky case with funny facts, but the problem of
relating transmissions of data to copyright law is one that will only
grow in importance in the years ahead. At some point, real guidance will have to be provided, whether the Court likes it or not.

